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4  The impact of judicial case management and alternative dispute resolution on 
the fundamental rights of the parties 
4.1 Nature of procedural rights
Traditionally, English common law shied away from recognising the fundamental 
principles of civil procedural law in the form of basic rights or guarantees accorded 
to the parties. As Jolowicz aptly remarked, “English law tends rather to take [these 
guarantees] for granted than to enshrine [them] in a legislative text”.
164
 Since this 
statement was made close to fifty years ago there has been a dramatic change in the 
English approach. First and foremost, the incorporation into English domestic law 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms
165
 by the Human Rights Act
166
 resulted in the statutory recognition of 
fundamental human rights for everyone in England.
167 In the procedural field the 
adoption of article 6(1) of the convention, providing for a fair trial to litigants, 
brought about a sea change in civil procedural law. For the first time in history a 
fundamental procedural right was enshrined in statute which required courts to 
interpret all domestic law in conformity with this provision.
168
 Secondly, whereas 
practical commentaries on civil litigation dominated the literature in the past, the 
mammoth work of Andrews on civil procedure, which has been described by Lord 
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164 Cappelletti and Tallon (eds) Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation (1973) 664. 
Jolowicz added that the fundamental principles of English law, such as the audi alteram partem rule, 
could only be discovered “by a process of extrapolation or generalisation from a host of individual 
instances” – (n 2) 128 and 172.
165 1950.
166 1998.
167 Wadham and Mountfield Human Rights Act 1998 (2000) ch 8.
168 Wadham and Mountfield (n 167) 5, 84-85; Andrews (n 2) 149-151. The impact of this provision 
on English law falls outside the ambit of this paper – see Andrews (n 2) ch 7. See generally on 
the importance of fundamental rights or guarantees in civil proceedings, Cappelletti and Tallon 
(n 164); De Vos Grondslae van die Siviele Prosesreg (1988 thesis RAU). On the development of 
these principles, see Engelmann et al A History of Continental Civil Procedure (1972) 3-81. For a 
discussion on the position in different legal systems, see Habscheid (ed) Effectiveness of Judicial 
Protection and Constitutional Order (1983) 7 et seq; and De Vos “Die grondwetlike beskerming 
van siviele prosesregtelike waarborge in Suid-Afrika” 1991 TSAR 353 356-361; see also De Vos 
“Civil procedural law and the constitution of 1996: an appraisal of procedural guarantees in civil 
proceedings” 1997 TSAR 444. Well-known international instruments, other than the European 
Convention, recognising fundamental procedural rights, are the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (a 10); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (a 14); and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (a 8) – see Sieghart The Lawful Rights of Mankind (1985) 169 et seq.
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Woolf as “a serious book”,
169
 took the subject to a new level by giving prominent 
attention to the principles underlying the rules as well as the guarantees accorded 
to the parties.
170
Different legal systems adopted different ways of giving recognition to 
fundamental procedural rights. Apart from the modern English approach of 
incorporating an international human rights instrument in its domestic law, three 
other methods may be discerned: 
(i)  as was the case in England before the adoption of the European convention, 
the rights are not explicitly stated in the law books; they can only be inferred 
from specific legislative provisions;
(ii)  as is the case in France, the rights are explicitly recognised in the procedural 
code but as such they form part of the ordinary law of the land and are not 
accorded a higher status; and
(iii)  following the American, German and South African example, procedural 
rights are entrenched in the constitutions concerned and the courts have the 
power to invalidate legislation or other forms of state action infringing such 
rights.
171
This brief description provides a fitting background for a discussion of the recognition 
of civil procedural rights in Australia. Generally speaking, most jurisdictions in 
Australia do not accord any special status to the guarantees of civil litigants. For 
example, the right to be heard is usually not explicitly mentioned in legislation or 
court rules but it may be inferred from specific provisions or gleaned from court 
decisions. Western Australia is illustrative of this approach, which accords broadly 
with the traditional English approach.
172 However, a significant development 
occurred when Australia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1980.
173
 Article 14 of the covenant encapsulates the guarantee of a fair 
hearing by stating:
“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of ... his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
174
This event was taken an important step further by the Australian Capital Territory 
and Victoria when they passed human rights acts incorporating a number of covenant 
rights, including the right to a fair trial, into their domestic laws.
175
 Both jurisdictions 
adopted the English “dialogue model” in terms of which the court may declare a 
law to be incompatible with the human rights act but, instead of invalidating the 
law, the court then refers the matter to parliament for reconsideration of the law in 
question.
176
 
 These two jurisdictions clearly took the lead in Australia by explicitly giving 
recognition to the right to a fair trial in their domestic laws. In the authors’ opinion 
the provision endorsing the right to a fair trial may act as a yardstick against which 
169 Andrews (n 2) vii.
170 (n 2) 49-57 and 59-232. 
171 See De Vos (n 168) 1991 TSAR 356-361 and De Vos (n 168) 1997 TSAR 451-461.
172 See Kendall and Curthoys Civil Procedure Western Australia (loose-leaf) par 1.0.8B.
173 Colbran et al (n 1) 27.
174 Sieghart (n 168) 182-183.
175 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) – s 21(1) and Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) – s 24(1); Colbran et al (n 1) 28.
176 Colbran et al (n 1) 28; Hemming and Penovic (n 18) 32. 
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the wide case management powers of judges may be measured. Colbran et al are to 
the point in saying that “the right to a fair hearing may operate as a counterbalance 
to traditional or evolving civil procedures, particularly where judicial discretion is 
involved”.
177
4.2 Impact of case management powers on the fundamental rights of the parties
A core guarantee under the right to a fair trial is a party’s right to present his or her 
case to the court for a judicial determination; in other words, a party has the right to 
his or her “day in court”.
178
 However, since the advent of judicial case management 
powers it has become crystal clear in the authors’ view that a party’s right to a day 
in court has lost much of its meaning. Broadly speaking this right may be curtailed 
in two ways. 
4.2.1 Curtailing a party’s right to present its case fully
A party may be prohibited from presenting its case to the court as planned if the 
court determines that the party failed to follow correct procedures in the context 
of pleading its case or if it failed to comply strictly with relevant case management 
directions. The Aon Risk Services case
179
 made it clear that deciding a case on its 
merits and dispensing justice on that basis is not the paramount consideration. If the 
court determines on the basis of case management considerations that the party’s 
request for an amendment of its pleading is ill-founded the court may refuse the 
relief and thus prevent the party from presenting its case in accordance with its 
amended version of the facts.
180
 Furthermore, the court may, if necessary, limit 
the number of witnesses a party wishes to call, thus limiting the party’s right to 
present its case fully.
181
 A court may also prevent a party from calling a witness if 
the party did not strictly comply with the judge’s direction relating to the delivery 
of that witness’s statement prior to the trial. Two cases call for brief consideration to 
illustrate the last-mentioned judicial sanction.
(a) Hodgson v Amcor Ltd; Amcor Ltd v Barnes (No 3)
182
When the trial in this case had proceeded to the end of the third week Amcor sought 
to call a witness called Conn. However, Hodgson objected to this evidence inter alia 
on the ground that Conn’s witness statement was not delivered in compliance with 
the court’s case management direction. Amcor was directed to deliver its witness 
statements by 18 February 2011, which it duly did, with the exception of Conn’s 
statement. The latter statement was delivered only on 29 April 2011, which was 
19 days before the commencement of the trial. Despite non-compliance with this 
direction counsel for Amcor indicated in the opening address at the start of the trial 
that they proposed to call Conn as a witness.
183
Vickery J commenced by sounding a cautionary note regarding the role of case 
management directions:
177 (n 1) 28.
178 The phrase “day in court” was coined by Amos in “A day in court at home and abroad” 1926 CLJ 
340; see Andrews (n 2) 212; De Vos (n 168) 1997 TSAR 457.
179 (n 59).
180 See par 2.3.1 above.
181 See par 2.2 above.
182 2011 VSC 272.
183 (n 182) – for these facts see par 26, 33 and 34.
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“[C]ase management orders designed to serve the interests of justice in the course of a trial, 
particularly a long and complex matter such as the present case are not immutable. The procedures 
set in place for the management of the trial must be capable of reasonable adaptation to ensure 
that the trial is in fact conducted in accordance with the interests of justice as the case proceeds to 
judgment.”
184
 
The judge proceeded by adding that “it is axiomatic that a just determination 
of a proceeding is the product of a trial, which must be conducted fairly and in 
accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness”.
185
 Vickery 
J further argued that these principles are supported by the Civil Procedure Act,
186
 
which has the overarching purpose inter alia “to facilitate the just”
187
resolution of 
the issues.
188 The judge then emphasised that the act specifically states that nothing 
in it is intended to override the charter of human rights, which provides for a fair 
hearing.
189
 Procedural fairness, according to Vickery J, “includes the right of a party 
to present relevant evidence in support of its case ...”
190
 The judge then summarised 
the legal position by saying that the act calls “for a balance to be applied between the 
case management requirements of achieving an efficient, timely and cost effective 
resolution of the real issues in dispute, and the requirements for a fair hearing to 
achieve a just outcome ....”
191
 Finally, looking at the facts, Vickery J emphasised 
that the statement was delivered 19 days before the trial and the opponent was also 
apprised at the outset of the trial that Amcor intended to call Conn as a witness. Thus, 
there would be no surprise and no prejudice caused to the opponent.
192
 Therefore, 
the balance between case management considerations and the dictates of a fair trial 
clearly favoured a ruling allowing Conn to be called as a witness.
193
In the authors’ view Vickery J must be commended for the balanced approach 
he adopted in this case. This judgment illustrates the important role that a statutory 
provision proclaiming the right to a fair trial can play in curbing excessive judicial 
case management.
(b) Attorney-General of Botswana v Aussie Diamond Products Pty Ltd (No 2)
194
A similar scenario presented itself in this case, but the outcome was in stark contrast 
with Hodgson v Amcor.
195
 A case management direction was given for the exchange 
of witness statements, which required AG Botswana to deliver its witness statements 
by 5 May 2009 and Aussie Diamond to do likewise by 3 July 2009. AG Botswana 
failed to comply with this direction and delivered the statement of a witness called 
Franken only on 29 August 2009, almost four months after the due date. However, 
this was still approximately six weeks before the trial, which was due to commence 
on 12 October 2009. AG Botswana provided a reason for this delay, saying that 
Franken was initially unwilling to testify but after several requests he eventually 
184 (n 182) par 27.
185 (n 182) par 28.
186 (n 32).
187 emphasis in the original.
188 (n 182) par 28.
189 (n 175) where charter is cited.
190 (n 182) par 31.
191 (n 182) par 32.
192 (n 182) par 33-34.
193 (n 182) par 35.
194 2012 WASCA 73.
195 (n 182).
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agreed during August to cooperate and give evidence.
196
 The trial judge rejected 
AG Botswana’s application shortly before the trial to extend the time for service of 
Franken’s statement, thus preventing it to present this evidence at the trial.
197
 The 
objectives embodied in the rules of the supreme court
198
 and the importance of case 
management principles acknowledged in the Aon Risk Services case 
199
 were cited as 
authority for concluding that the interests of justice did not favour granting the relief 
sought.
200 This decision was confirmed on appeal.201
It is notable that no reference was made in this case to a party’s right to a fair 
trial, including the right to present the party’s case by calling witnesses supporting 
its case. It is submitted that if Western Australia had a statutory fair trial provision 
like Victoria the outcome could have been different, especially taking into account 
that AG Botswana had delivered its statement some six weeks before the trial and 
had given a plausible excuse for its delay.
4.2.2 Directing the parties to proceed to mediation
The proponents of compulsory mediation argue that the parties’ right to present 
their cases for a judicial determination is not affected by this process because they 
are compelled only to attend the mediation and if that fails they may proceed to 
trial.
202
 However, this argument loses sight of the costs involved in mediation and 
the resulting duplication of costs if the parties failed to resolve the dispute and 
have to return to court. Bamford and Rankin are to the point in saying that many 
litigants may only have sufficient funds to pursue one method of dispute resolution 
and not both that may be forced upon them.
203
 They add: “In such a case, compelled 
mediation may serve to deny a party their right to trial. This is a serious injustice.”
204
Mandatory mediation and the pressure to settle that is brought to bear upon the 
parties may also result in the less powerful party or the one with fewer resources 
accepting an unfavourable settlement.
205
 Where a party has a strong grievance 
compulsory mediation and a consequent settlement may also lead to complications, 
as noted by Gyles J in Freeman v National Australia Bank Ltd: “[T]here is little 
doubt that it would have been better for all concerned if the merits of the appellant’s 
case had been fully explored in open court and dealt with by a reasoned judgment 
without the complication of the agreement arrived at as a result of the mediation.”
206
Ingleby argues that the shift from litigation to mediation has resulted in a rule 
favouring settlement and a notion that litigation is a deviant in the context of dispute 
resolution.
207
 The author’s argument also suggests that the parties’ rights and legal 
entitlements are not regarded as important considerations in this new milieu.
208
 He 
196 (n 194) par 129-134.
197 (n 194) par 135.
198 (n 45) o 1.4A and 1.4B.
199 (n 59).
200 (n 194) par 136-137.
201 (n 194) par 162.
202 Arthur (n 18) 247; Bamford and Rankin (n 1) 223.
203 (n 1) 223.
204 (n 1) 223. 
205 Willis (n 17) 412; Bamford and Rankin (n 1) 225.
206 2006 FCAFC 67 par 53.
207 (n 18) 450.
208 450.
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concludes on a powerful note: “If it really is the case that ‘there is no point in looking 
for justice, you should settle for what’s on offer,’ then why have courts at all?”
209
As mentioned,
210
 England has not adopted outright mandatory mediation. Instead 
courts have opted for a compromise in terms of which they regularly encourage 
the parties, even in strong terms if appropriate, to agree to mediation. It seems that 
the right of access to a fair trial under article 6 of the European convention
211
 has 
influenced the English position, as Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust; 
Steel v Joy and Halliday
212
 illustrates. In the Halsey case the defendant had refused 
the plaintiff’s invitations to mediate and it was argued on appeal that the defendant 
should not be entitled to costs as a result of its attitude. The court of appeal endorsed 
the judicial encouragement of the parties to mediate, even to do so in the strongest 
terms; but the court expressed the view that, having regard to article 6 of the 
European convention, “to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to 
mediation would be to impose an unacceptable obstruction on their right of access 
to the court”.
213
 On this basis the court found no reason to make an adverse costs 
order against the defendant because of its failure to agree to mediate.
214
In the authors’ opinion the recognition of article 6 of the European convention in 
English domestic laws created an important mechanism to curb the excessive use of 
mediation, especially in cases where it is not appropriate. This position is clearly in 
contrast with the approach of Australian courts.
215
5 Assessment of case management and alternative dispute resolution in Australia
In the authors’ view case management is an important tool to control the 
proceedings in order to prevent unreasonable delays and obstructionist conduct on 
the part of the parties or their lawyers. Case management can therefore play an 
important role in the quest for the expeditious adjudication of disputes. However, 
case management is not an end in itself to be pursued at all costs. If a court uses 
its wide case management powers to prevent a party from presenting an arguable 
case fully, simply because the party failed to comply strictly with case management 
directions, the question would arise whether the court is fulfilling its primary role 
of dispensing justice. There can be no doubt that a court is duty-bound to prevent 
an abuse of its process and it has statutory and inherent powers to deal with such 
conduct.
216
 But apart from that, it is submitted that a court should not prevent a 
party from presenting an arguable case because of some procedural failures, unless 
there are really exceptional circumstances. Has the time not come for Australian 
courts to take stock of how far they have gone on the case management track? Case 
management is good but is too much case management still good?
As mentioned,
217
 the authors support the notion of the voluntary use of mediation 
and other alternative dispute resolution processes by the parties. But have law 
reformers and the courts in Australia not gone too far in their relentless drive 
to promote these out of court dispute resolution processes above courtroom 
209 (n 18) 451.
210 par 3.1.
211 (n 168).
212 2004 4 All ER 920 par 4-11.
213 (n 212) par 9.
214 (n 212) par 50-54.
215 par 54.
216 See eg Bamford and Rankin (n 1) 139-141.
217 par 3.2 above.
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
TSAR 2018 . 1 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
24 DE VOS AND BROODRYK
adjudication? Have the courts not diminished their important constitutional role 
as an institution of governance in the context of dispute resolution, which may 
negatively affect the evolution of the law? And have the courts not diluted the 
right of the parties to present their cases to a court for a judicial determination? In 
other words, has the right of the parties to their day in court not become a hollow 
guarantee? It is cold comfort to assure a party with limited financial resources 
that he or she could proceed to trial if mediation fails. One process may be all the 
party can afford, causing him or her to accept an unfavourable settlement. Is that 
justice?
218
 In the authors’ opinion these are fundamental issues calling for serious 
consideration by Australian courts and other stakeholders.
6 Judicial case management and alternative dispute resolution in South Africa
6.1 Introduction
South Africa has a hybrid legal system – “an English orientated judicial and 
procedural framework, which serves as the mechanism for the enforcement 
of continental flavoured substantive rules of law”.219 The South African civil 
procedural system is, similar to the Australian system, of common-law origin and 
it is characterised by the adversarial system of litigation. The introduction of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter constitution) did not 
affect the basic common law features of the South African civil justice system,
220
 
but it does give full recognition to the procedural guarantees of civil litigants.
221
 
Thus, civil procedural law obtained a constitutional dimension. 
The most important constitutional guarantee is the right to a fair trial embodied 
in section 34 of the constitution.
222 It is likely the most significant procedural 
innovation brought about by the final constitution and its importance can hardly be 
over-emphasised. As stated before the right to a fair trial “constitutes the very core 
of procedural justice in civil litigation and provides the basis for other more specific 
guarantees”.
223
 In the authors’ view the right to be heard (audi alteram partem), 
including more specifically the parties’ right to present their cases for a judicial 
determination, is undoubtedly one of the most important guarantees incorporated 
under the right to a fair trial.
218 See Bamford and Rankin (n 1) 237.
219 De Vos “South African civil procedural law in historical and social context” 2002 Stell LR 236 244. 
220 De Vos (n 219) 245.
221 De Vos (n 219) 248.
222 S 34 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application 
of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum”.
223 De Vos (n 168) 1997 TSAR 444 454.
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Compared to Australia, South Africa has been relatively slow to transition to 
judicial case management
224
 and to embrace alternative dispute resolution.
225
 For 
the most part, adversarialism continues to dominate civil proceedings, with the 
parties exercising control over the pre-trial and trial phases of civil litigation.
226
 
The judge is assigned a passive role, whereas the parties, normally represented by 
their legal representatives, play an active role. It is up to the parties to institute legal 
proceedings and to prepare their cases for trial. The parties further determine what 
evidence is to be presented to the court and they question the witnesses.
227
The following passage by Ngcobo CJ succinctly describes the current state of 
the South African civil justice system, particularly with reference to the “overly 
adversarial” nature of civil proceedings:
“Our civil justice system is still characterised by cumbersome, complex and time-consuming 
pre-trial procedures, overloaded court rolls, which necessitate postponements, delays in matters 
coming to trial and, at times, compels litigants to conclude settlements not acceptable to them. It is 
expensive, slow, complex, fragmented, and overly adversarial.”
228
 
The following part of this article, after briefly mentioning the South African 
court structure and legislative framework, considers the position in South Africa 
specifically insofar as case management and alternative dispute resolution are 
concerned. 
6.2 Court structure and legislative framework
The constitution is the supreme law of South Africa. In this regard, section 2 of the 
constitution provides that “[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; 
law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and obligations imposed by it must 
be fulfilled”. South Africa has a single national court system, as opposed to the 
224 also compared to, for example, the origins of judicial case management in the United States. In 
relation to case management in the United States, Marcus, Sherman and Erichson Complex Litigation, 
Cases and Materials on Advanced Civil Procedure (2010) 15 state as follows: “[w]hatever the overall 
tranquillity of federal civil litigation in 1938, by the late 1940s there was a widely-felt concern 
among federal judges about whether ‘protracted’ litigation, particularly antitrust litigation, should 
be handled differently. A 1951 study by the Judicial Conference of the United States suggested that 
the solution was greater involvement by judges”. By the 1970s, Chayes commented that “[t]he judge 
is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case …” See Chayes “The role of the judge in 
public law litigation” 1976 Harvard Law Review 1281 1284.
225 Anthimos, Baker, De Palo, Herbert, Judin and Tereshchenko “International commercial mediation” 
2011 International Lawyers 111 119. 
226 Erasmus “Judicial case management and the adversarial mindset – the new Namibian rules of court” 
2015 TSAR 259 261.
227 De Vos (n 219) 245.
228 http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Speech-of-the-Chief-
Justice-2011.pdf (22-05-2017). Mogoeng CJ recently confirmed that the current South African 
judiciary does not function optimally and that they are not properly trained to conduct judicial case 
management: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/court-lack-skills---mogoeng-1637001 (22-05-
2017). According to the South African Law Commission, “[t]he most common general complaint 
about the current justice system in South Africa is that the cost of litigation is prohibitive. This 
prevents meaningful access to courts and even those with access are often victims of delay. For 
most litigants, delay means added expense and for many people justice delayed is justice denied. 
Delay combined with the cost of litigation has put justice beyond the reach of the ordinary citizen. 
The incomprehensibility and adversarial nature of the process with a resulting lack of control 
(parties can only participate in an indirect manner) furthermore leads to a sense of frustration and 
disempowerment”. In this regard, see The South African Law Commission “Alternative dispute 
resolution” Issue Paper 8, Project 94 (1997) 15. 
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Australian federal court structure. The South African court structure is as set out 
in section 166 of the constitution. The section provides for a constitutional court, 
a supreme court of appeal, various divisions of the high court of South Africa, 
magistrates courts and other specialist courts introduced through acts of parliament. 
Noteworthy legislative sources concerning civil litigation in the superior courts 
include the Superior Courts Act 2013 and the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the 
Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South 
Africa (hereafter high court rules).
229
 The Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act 
2012 provides inter alia that the chief justice of the constitutional court is appointed 
as the head of the judiciary and that the constitutional court is the highest court in 
all matters.
230
 Practice directives, also commonly referred to as practice directions, 
issued in the various provincial divisions by the judges-president from time to time 
contain important information regarding practice and procedure in the division in 
which they were issued. These practice directives are especially important when 
considering the South African courts’ approach to case management and alternative 
dispute resolution. 
6.3 Case management 
Rule 37 of the high court rules compels parties to attend a pre-trial conference 
with the aim of reaching a negotiated agreement regarding certain issues and to 
limit the duration of the litigation insofar as time-consuming administrative issues 
are concerned.
231
 Rule 37 presents relatively few opportunities for the exercise of 
unencumbered judicial discretion
232
 and, for the most part, judicial participation 
in the pre-trial process in terms of the rule is limited to circumstances where the 
parties have consented thereto.
233
 The default position in respect of the conduct 
of pre-trial conferences in terms of rule 37 is that they take place between the 
parties, without the judge being present. While rule 37(8)(a) enables a judge in 
certain circumstances to, mero motu or at the request of a party, conduct a pre-
trial conference in chambers, rule 37(8)(b) dampens enthusiasm by providing that 
“[n]o provision of this rule shall be interpreted as requiring a judge before whom 
a conference is held to be involved in settlement negotiations …” All that the rule 
requires is that the pre-trial conference minutes must reflect “(c) that every party 
claiming relief has requested his opponent to make a settlement proposal and that 
such opponent has reacted thereto” and “(d) whether any issue has been referred by 
the parties for mediation, arbitration or decision by a third party and on what basis 
it has been so referred”.
234
 The scope for judicial control and initiative within the 
ambit of rule 37 appears limited. 
229 also commonly referred to as the Uniform Court Rules. 
230 s 1-3. See also s 8 of the Superior Courts Act 2013.
231 See Lekota v Editor ‘Tribute’ Magazine 1995 2 SA 706 (W) regarding the stock-tacking nature of the 
pre-trial conference. See also MT v CT 2016 4 SA 193 (WCC) par 26. See also, for example, Road 
Accident Fund v Krawa 2012 2 SA 346 (ECG) par 17 where the court held that r 37 affords the parties 
“an opportunity ‘amongst other matters, to endeavour to find ways of curtailing the duration of the 
trial by redefining the issues to be tried’” and MEC for Economic Affairs, Environment & Tourism: 
Eastern Cape v Kruizenga 2010 4 All SA 23 (SCA) par 6 where the court held that the rule also aims 
“to facilitate settlements between the parties, narrow the issues and to curb costs”.
232 For example, r 37(10) provides that “[a] judge in chambers may, without hearing the parties, order 
deviation from the time limits in this rule”.
233 r 37(8)(c); Flemming “Case management” 2011 Advocate 29.
234 r 37(6).
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In December 1997, a limited form of civil case management was introduced in the 
Cape high court in the form of rule 37A.
235
 According to Erasmus, the introduction 
of the rule constituted “a major step towards bringing South African practice into 
line with developments in most common-law countries in which the judge has been 
accorded an increasingly important management role and responsibility in the pre-
trial phase of a civil case”.
236
 The rule has, however, since been repealed and its 
introduction has been labelled a failed experiment.
237
 The reasons proffered for its 
failure essentially relate to an inability to properly monitor and evaluate the rule’s 
implementation and operation, inter alia because of the lack of proper infrastructure, 
such as adequate computer hardware and software, and personnel to administer the 
system.
238
South African superior courts possess inherent jurisdiction. In Chunguete v 
Minister of Home Affairs,
239
 Flemming J referred to Sir Jack Jacob’s lecture delivered 
in the 1970s
240
 and quoted the following features of the court’s inherent jurisdiction: 
“(1) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is exercisable as part of the process of the administration 
of justice. It is part of procedural law, both civil and criminal, and not of substantive law; it is 
invoked in relation to the process of litigation. 
(2) The distinctive and basic feature of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is that it is exercisable 
by summary process .... 
(3) Because it is part of the machinery of justice, the inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be 
invoked ... in relation ... to anyone, whether a party or not, and in respect of matters which are not 
raised as issues in the litigation between the parties. 
(4) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is a concept which must be distinguished from the exercise 
of judicial discretion .... 
(5) The inherent jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised in any given case, notwithstanding that 
there are Rules of Court governing the circumstances of such case ....”
241
 
According to Jacob, the exercise of these powers was derived simply from the very 
nature of the court as a superior court of law. It is for that reason that the jurisdiction 
is “inherent”.
242
 “The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of 
the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering 
justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.”
243
 Flemming J 
states the following regarding the meaning of “inherent jurisdiction”:
“What is appropriately called the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is related to the Court’s functioning towards 
securing a just and respected process of coming to a decision and is not a factor which determines 
what order the Court may make after due process has been achieved. That is a function of the 
substantive law. The Court – always – is charged with holding the scales of justice. It is not within its 
task to add weights to the scales by detracting from a right given by the substantive law or granting 
a right not given by the substantive law.”
244
 
235 Erasmus “Case management moves ahead: new r 37A in force in Cape high court” 1998:1 De Rebus 
27; Erasmus “Case management: the demise of Cape rule 37A” 2001:5 De Rebus 39.
236 Erasmus (n 235 (1998)) 27.
237 Erasmus (n 235 (2001)) 39.
238 Erasmus (n 235 (2001)) 39. 
239 1990 2 SA 836 (W).
240 Jacob “The inherent jurisdiction of the court” 1970 Current Legal Problems 23 24.
241 (n 239) 841 – emphasis in the original.
242 (n 239) 841; (n 240) 27. 
243 (n 239) 841.
244 (n 239) 848. 
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Taitz succinctly describes the courts’ inherent jurisdiction as follows: 
“[T]hose (unwritten) powers, ancillary to its common law and statutory powers, without which the 
court would be unable to act in accordance with justice and good reason. The inherent powers of 
the court are quite separate and distinct from its common law and its statutory powers, eg in the 
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the Court may regulate its own procedure independently of the 
Rules of Court.”
245
 
The courts’ inherent jurisdiction is utilised with a view, inter alia, to regulating 
the courts’ procedures in the interests of the proper administration of justice,
246
 
especially where there is no rule dealing with a particular matter.
247
 Where the 
rules provide for a particular matter, the scope for a court to exercise its inherent 
powers is more limited.
248
 Courts may nevertheless act outside the powers provided 
for specifically in the rules.249 Where the rules do not provide for a particular set 
of circumstances, the court has inherent jurisdiction to read the rules in a manner 
that facilitates the administration of justice and to handle the matter along practical 
lines.
250
Furthermore, section 173 of the constitution provides that “[t]he Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court of South Africa each has 
the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the 
common law, taking into account the interests of justice”. 
251
 It enshrines the inherent 
jurisdiction of our superior courts.
252
 Section 173 constitutionally empowers courts 
to develop the common law, which comprises not only procedural law but also 
substantive law.
253
 An example of the development of procedural common law is 
the development of a class action procedural framework by Wallis JA in Trustees 
for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd 
(Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae).
254
 The section has also been used to 
develop substantive common law. For example, Cameron JA in Fourie v Minister of 
245 Taitz The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1985) 8-9.
246 See, for example, Universal City Studios Inc v Network Video (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 734 (A); Krygkor 
Pensioenfonds v Smith 1993 3 SA 459 (A); White v Moffett Building & Contracting (Pty) Ltd 1952 
3 SA 307 (O); California Spice and Marinade (Pty) Ltd in re: Bankorp v California Spice and 
Marinade (Pty) Ltd; Fair O’Rama Property Investments CC; Tsaperas; and Tsaperas 1997 4 All SA 
317 (W); Soller v Maintenance Magistrate, Wynberg 2006 2 SA 66 (C); Carmel Trading Co Ltd v 
Commissioner South African Revenue Service 2008 2 SA 433 (SCA).
247 See, for example, S v Pennington 1997 4 SA 1076 (CC). See also Phillips v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 2006 1 SA 505 (CC) par 46 for the limits of this power. The Krygkor case (n 
246); Neal v Neal 1959 1 SA 828 (N); Matyeka v Kaaber 1960 4 SA 900 (T); Watson v Krieks 1963 
3 SA 546 (O); A v R Kinder- en Kindersorgvereniging 1996 1 SA 649 (T); Beinash v Wixley 1997 2 
All SA 241 (A).
248 Western Bank Ltd v Packery 1977 3 SA 137 (T); Collective Investments (Pty) Ltd v Brink 1978 2 SA 
252 (N).
249 Moulded Components and Rotomoulding SA (Pty) Ltd v Coucourakis 1979 2 SA 457 (W).
250 Brown Bros Ltd v Doise 1955 1 SA 75 (W), quoted with approval in Republikeinse Publikasies 
(Edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies (Edms) Bpk 1972 1 SA 773 (A) 783.
251 SABC Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC) par 35-36; Legal Aid 
Board v S 2011 1 All SA 378 (SCA); Coetzee v National Commissioner of Police 2011 2 SA 227 
(GNP); FirstRand Bank Ltd v Beyer 2011 1 SA 196 (GNP). 
252 SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC) 
par 88; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC). See also Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 10 
BCLR 1135 (CC) par 42. 
253 the SABC case (n 251) par 35 and 36; Legal Aid Board v S (n 251); the Coetzee case (n 251); the Beyer 
case (n 251). 
254 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA).
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Home Affairs
255
 developed the common-law concept of marriage to embrace same-
sex partners.
256
 
Judicial case management in South Africa is largely dependent upon the exercise 
of the South African superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction. It is thus conceivable that 
there exists a stronger possibility that ad hoc approaches adopted by judges in the 
respective divisions of the high court of South Africa to judicial case management 
of civil proceedings may vary, perhaps even inordinately, from case to case. In order 
inter alia to address the lack of uniformity, Mogoeng CJ stated the following: 
“The leadership of the Judiciary at all levels has resolved to begin a massive project of overhauling 
all the Rules of the High Court and Magistrates’ Courts with the view of doing away with archaic 
Rules, progress- and efficiency-retarding Rules, to inject flexibility, facilitate the full scale 
implementation of electronic filing and electronic record-keeping, video conferencing, judicial case 
management harmonisation or streamlining of all Court Rules.”
257
 
A judicial case flow management committee was established to implement the 
project Mogoeng CJ mentioned, called the Case-Flow Management Pilot Project 
(hereafter project). The project was launched in 2012 in five pilot court sites, 
namely in both Gauteng divisions, the Western Cape division and the KwaZulu-
Natal divisions (Pietermaritzburg and Durban) of the high court of South Africa.
258
 
The project ended on 31 March 2015.
259
 Preliminary indications are that the project 
delivered desirable results in the divisions where it was implemented. Since its 
commencement in the KwaZulu-Natal division, the waiting time for trial dates has 
decreased from twelve months to between six and eight months in Durban, and from 
two to three years to between eight and twelve months in Pietermaritzburg.
260
 In the 
Western Cape, the waiting time for the allocation of a trial date has decreased from 
255 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA).
256 The minority decision of Farlam JA also developed the common law to allow same-sex marriage 
but read in wording to the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 that allowed such marriages to occur. However, 
consider the constitutional court’s judgment in Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). See also, for example, Khoza v Body Corporate of Ella Court 2014 2 
SA 112 (GSJ) par 27 where the court held that “[e]ven if the aforesaid rule were to be held to be a 
substantive rule I would still have been obliged to consider whether the common-law substantive 
rule as it stands should not have been developed and extended to avoid irreparable prejudice to an 
applicant for a rescission of an order. Section 173 of the Constitution obliges me to do so”.
257 Mogoeng (n 228). 
258 Hawkey “Attorneys to benefit from better case management - KZNLS AGM 2012” 2012:12 De 
Rebus 13. At a 2013 briefing of the office of the chief justice (OCJ), Mr Doralingu, the head of court 
services of the OCJ, stated that the project is aimed at reducing the backlog of court cases and that 
practice directives would be drawn up to empower the courts’ registrars to manage cases as they 
arrived, so that by the time they reached the judge, “various shortcuts had been taken and those cases 
that could have been disposed of at an earlier stage had been properly managed”. According to Mr 
Doralingu, the judge would take control of the matters thereafter. In this regard, see https://pmg.org.
za/committee-meeting/16571/ (26-05-2017). A few other divisions appear to have attempted to adopt 
judicial case management approaches, such as the divisions situated in Bhisho and East London. In 
this regard, see for example: http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/103/
Day%205%20Van%20Zyl.pdf (29-05-2017). However, it is unclear whether they have adopted the 
project’s practice directive or whether they have adopted (any) other judicial case management 
practice directives. Further, there does not appear to be any empirical data to assess whether judicial 
case management in these divisions has been successful compared to implementation at the project’s 
pilot court sites. 
259 ht tp://www.judiciary.org.za/doc/MEDIA-ADVISORY_CASE-FLOW-MANAGEMENT-
WORKSHOP_08-April-2015.pdf (29-05-2017); http://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/new-system-improve 
-access-justice (23-05-2017). 
260 Manyathi-Jele “Progress on judicial case-flow management” 2014:5 De Rebus 10.
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between two to three years to three months.
261
 “In Gauteng, the waiting period for a 
trial date was reduced from one year to nine months at the start of the project. The 
Gauteng north high court had 224 921 outstanding cases on the civil roll, which 
were reduced to 144 027 by February 2015.”
262
 
Prior to the implementation of the project, the office of the chief justice issued 
a draft practice directive entitled “Case management, allocation of cases and case 
management conferences”, which all pilot courts had to implement.
263
 The directive 
distinguishes between two phases: from the institution of proceedings until the 
close of pleadings and from the close of pleadings until certification that a matter 
is trial-ready.
264 The directive provides that the registrar must manage the first 
phase
265
 and a designated judge is responsible for managing the second phase of 
the litigation.
266
 The judge must schedule an initial case management conference
267
 
and, before this conference takes place, the parties must confer about the nature 
and basis of their claims and defences, the possibilities for a prompt settlement or 
resolution of the case, and each of the issues to be addressed at the conference.
268
 
These issues include the control and scheduling of discovery,
269
 the possibility of 
settlement or mediation of the dispute
270
 and such other matters as may facilitate 
the just and speedy disposal of the case.
271
 Immediately after the completion of the 
initial case management conference, the judge must issue a case management order 
that addresses these issues.
272 Before the trial takes place, the judge must hold a final 
pre-trial conference.
273
 The directive also provides that it must, as far as possible, 
be implemented in consonance with rule 37 and that, where necessary, directions 
must be obtained from the judge to whom a matter is allocated in order to resolve 
difficulties in this respect.274
The Gauteng local division of the high court of South Africa issued a further case 
management directive effective from the first term of 2015.275 This directive provides 
that only matters involving expert evidence shall be subject to judicial case-flow 
management and require certification before proceeding to trial on the set-down 
date.
276
 In terms of the directive, a motion court dedicated to interlocutory matters is 
required to deal with all instances of non-compliance in trial matters with the rules, 
including rule 37, and the court’s practice manual.
277
 Further, a judicial pre-trial 
261 (n 259) and (n 260) 65; http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2015/04/13/justice-system-to-go-hi-tech 
(23-05-2017).
262 (n 259).
263 Office of the chief justice draft practice directive “Case management, allocation of cases and case 
management conferences” (2012).
264 http://johannesburgbar.co.za/wp-content/uploads/SGHC-Precinct-Planning-Document-v2.pdf> 
(23-05-2017).
265 (n 263) par 1. 
266 (n 263) par 5.
267 (n 263) par 6(1).
268 (n 263) par 6(2).
269 (n 263) par 6(3)(e).
270 (n 263) par 6(3)(k).
271 (n 263) par 6(3)(l).
272 (n 263) par 8.
273 (n 263) par 10.
274 (n 263) par 17; http://www.phoenyx.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Important-Notice-on-Civil-
Trial-Case-Management-at-the-GLD-07102014122009.pdf (23-05-2017). 
275 http://johannesburgbar.co.za/wp-content/uploads/AMENDED-CASE-MANAGEMENT-
DIRECTIVE-FOR-2015-20150625lt.pdf (23-05-2017). 
276 (n 275) par 1.
277 (n 275) par 4.1-4.2.
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conference to certify trial readiness is introduced.
278 Before such a “certification-
conference” takes place, the judge must be informed of various issues, including: 
confirmation that discovery is complete or, if it is incomplete, why that is the case 
and when it will be complete; a succinct summary of common cause facts about 
which no further evidence will be allowed at trial; and a statement of the questions 
of law and of fact that the trial court must decide.
279
 
The project clearly envisages a more participatory judge compared to the position 
that existed in the pilot courts prior to its implementation. It moves the judicial 
case management practice in these courts closer to the position in Australia. Rather 
than simply leaving it to the parties to control the pre-trial process, as rule 37 
essentially does, the judges in the pilot courts are expected to manage proceedings 
by continuously engaging the parties on various issues, including the scope of 
discovery and possible settlement of the dispute. One gets the sense that, whereas 
rule 37 only requires the parties to report to the judge on what they have done during 
the pre-trial stage, under the practice directive such reporting merely confirms what 
the judge already knows because he or she is integrally involved in the pre-trial 
process.
The project is commendable. However, implementation of the initiative was limited 
to pilot courts, leaving several divisions of the high court of South Africa outside 
the project’s scope.
280
 The approaches of South African courts to managing pre-trial 
proceedings may accordingly vary depending on which division has jurisdiction 
over the dispute. This does not take into account the variations in approaches of 
individual judges to managing complex cases. Importantly, just because a division 
has not adopted a practice directive that deals with judicial case management, this 
does not mean that the court would otherwise be precluded from actively managing 
complex cases that come before it. However, as it currently stands, in the authors’ 
view it would be misleading to say that it is generally the approach of the various 
divisions of the high court of South Africa to employ managerial judging in civil 
proceedings. 
South African high court judges are compelled to rely on their inherent jurisdiction 
without the benefit of legislative guidance on the issue of judicial case management. 
Although such discretionary freedom may encourage creativity and innovation 
insofar as judicial case management is concerned, it does not necessarily assist in 
promoting judicial certainty and uniformity across the different divisions of the 
high court of South Africa. Ad hoc procedural activism is, after all, one of the main 
criticisms of managerial judging.
281
 Further, the inherent limitations posed by the ad 
hoc nature of South African managerial judging has not been removed by developing 
comprehensive guidelines to assist judges to make managerial decisions.
282
 No other 
278 (n 275) par 7.
279 (n 275) par 8(1). 
280 Admittedly, it was somewhat challenging to obtain information from many of the divisions of the 
high court of South Africa, other than the pilot courts, regarding their particularised approaches to 
managing civil proceedings.
281 Resnik “Managerial judges” 1982-1983 Harv L Rev 444. According to Elliot “Managerial judging 
and the evolution of procedure” 1986 U Chi L Rev 306 308-309, the techniques advocated by judges 
in managing proceedings tend to vary widely. In other words, it lacks consistency and uniformity. 
According to Molot “An old judicial role for a new litigation era” 2003 Yale L J 27 41-42, such 
discretionary management tactics that vary inordinately from judge to judge may threaten litigants’ 
due process rights.
282 Meiring “Manual or automatic?” 2013 Advocate 34. For example, the following guides come to 
mind: Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (2005) and Manual for Complex 
Litigation (2017).
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meaningful form of continuous judicial guidance, training or support is available to 
the South African judiciary to assist it to properly manage civil litigation.
283
 
6.4 Alternative dispute resolution
The shift in South Africa from the adversarial mode of resolving disputes to one 
embracing modes of alternative dispute resolution has also been relatively slow 
compared to the transition in Australia.
284
 Arbitration is the most regulated South 
African alternative dispute resolution method. On the contrary, there is no single, 
general statute that regulates mediation in South Africa. Mediation in South Africa 
denotes a flexible concept and, consequently, one that is difficult to define. The 
concept connotes a different meaning to different users in different South African 
contexts. Its meaning varies when, for example, contrasting “private mediation” 
(where, generally, the mediation is triggered by contractual agreement) and various 
forms of “institutionalised mediation” (where mediation is connected to the courts 
or required by statute).
285
 Parties to civil proceedings instituted in a South African 
superior court can generally agree to submit the dispute to private mediation. 
However, there is no form of institutionalised mediation that provides for voluntary 
or mandatory mediation of disputes in superior courts.
Mediation rules, in the form of amendments to the rules regulating the conduct 
of proceedings of South African magistrates’ courts, were recently published by the 
department of justice and correctional services. These rules provide the procedure 
for the voluntary submission of civil disputes to mediation in selected courts.
286
 
The mediation rules apply to the voluntary submission by parties to mediation of 
disputes prior to commencement of litigation and disputes in litigation which have 
already commenced and as contemplated in rules 78 and 79.
287
 Rule 75 provides that 
the parties may refer a dispute to mediation prior to the commencement of litigation 
or after commencement of litigation but prior to judgment, provided that where 
the trial has commenced the parties must obtain the authorisation of the court. A 
judicial officer may at any time after the commencement of litigation, but before 
judgment, enquire into the possibility of mediation of a dispute and accord the 
parties an opportunity to refer the dispute to mediation.
Rule 37 of the high court rules was, for a long time, the only mechanism available 
to accommodate alternative dispute resolution in the high court.
288
 The rule does not 
require that the parties engage in arbitration or mediation in an attempt to resolve 
the dispute; it merely requires that the parties consider referring the dispute for 
arbitration or mediation and record their decision in this regard in the pre-trial 
conference minute. Sub-rule 37(6) states that:
“The minutes of the pre-trial conference shall be prepared and signed by or on behalf of every party 
and the following shall appear therefrom … (c) that every party claiming relief has requested his 
opponent to make a settlement proposal and that such opponent has reacted thereto; (d) whether any 
issue has been referred by the parties for mediation, arbitration or decision by a third party and on 
what basis it has been so referred …”
283 Stander “South Africa’s first lady judge president: Monica Leeuw” 2010 Advocate 18. 
284 Anthimos et al (n 225) 111 119. 
285 Boulle and Rycroft Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1997) 4-5.
286 r 72.
287 r 74.
288 Paleker “Mediation in South Africa: here but not all there” in Alexander (ed) Global Trends in 
Mediation (2006) 333 340.
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Apart from the reference to alternative dispute resolution in rule 37, it is now 
accepted that legal representatives are well advised to recommend mediation or 
they could be deprived of their costs, as could parties who unreasonably refuse to 
mediate.
289
 In this regard, in MB v NB,
290
 it was held that, in divorce proceedings, the 
parties’ legal representatives should advise them of the benefits of mediation. Each 
party was ordered by the court to bear their own costs, taxed on a party and party 
basis. The attorneys were deprived of their full attorney and client fees. Brassey AJ 
referred to the failure of the attorneys to act appropriately, ie to advise their clients 
of the benefits of mediation and held “[f]or this they are to blame and they must, 
I believe, shoulder the responsibility that comes from failing properly to serve the 
interests of their clients”.
291
 
It could be argued that, following the Brownlee decision, parties to certain disputes 
are obliged to consider the appropriateness of mediation
292
 and that a dispute should 
be referred to mediation where there is a reasonable possibility that it could result in 
the resolution of the dispute. Also, attorneys must advise their clients of the benefits 
of mediation and assist them to submit a dispute to mediation. Failure to do so may 
result in the issuing of an adverse cost order.
293
7 Conclusion
When comparing Australia and South Africa, it is apparent that there are marked 
differences in respect of these jurisdictions’ judicial approaches to case management 
and alternative dispute resolution. In Australia, the courts’ case management 
powers are regulated by legislation and court rules.
294
 In South Africa, judicial case 
management remains largely unregulated and dependent upon the exercise of the 
South African superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction. There is no statute or court rule 
that deals specifically with judicial case management in the superior courts. Further, 
Australian courts are generally afforded the power to minimise the adjudication of 
civil cases by diverting them to a process of alternative dispute resolution, especially 
mediation.
295
 Conversely, South African superior courts do not possess the power 
to compel parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution, including mediation. 
In other words, there is no form of institutionalised mediation that provides for 
voluntary or mandatory mediation of disputes in South African superior courts.
296
 
Nevertheless, the position in South Africa is evolving and increasingly 
resembles the position in Australia, specifically insofar as judicial approaches 
to case management and alternative dispute resolution are concerned. The 
recently implemented project demonstrates that there is an increased tendency 
in South Africa, firstly, to curtail party control in favour of judicial control over 
civil proceedings and, secondly, to regulate these powers by documenting them, 
specifically in the form of practice directives.297 Further, South African courts are 
beginning to recognise that mediation could be an extremely valuable tool to assist 
289 (n 225) 123.
290 2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ). 
291 (n 290) par 59. 
292 in the context of r 37 of the high court rules.
293 (n 284) 123. 
294 Willis (n 17).
295 Bamford and Rankin (n 1) 9.
296 Kuhner “Court-connected mediation compared: the cases of Argentina and the United States” 2005 
ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 1 13. 
297 Hawkey (n 258).
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our courts in managing civil litigation.
298
 Voluntary court-annexed mediation is also 
now an entrenched part of lower court practice, following its incorporation into the 
lower court rules. 
The question that arises is whether the continuous development of the South 
African civil procedural landscape in respect of the above issues is desirable. In 
other words, should South Africa emulate the position in Australia insofar as their 
courts’ approach to these issues is concerned? Case management is undoubtedly 
an important tool to enable the court to control the proceedings and to assist in 
ensuring the expeditious adjudication of disputes.
299
 Further, as mentioned, the idea 
of voluntary mediation as a dispute resolution method supplementary to courtroom 
adjudication resonates with the authors.
300
 However, there are concerns. These 
concerns relate to the impact of the move away from courtroom adjudication, and 
instead embracing alternative dispute resolution methods, on the role of the court 
as a state institution of governance and on the fundamental right of the parties to 
present their cases to a court for a judicial determination.
301
 
The authors are of the view that, because courts as state institutions of governance
302
 
have been entrusted with a specific function in resolving civil disputes, their role 
should not be diminished through absolute engagement in alternative dispute 
resolution processes. The courts are crucial to the continuous development of the 
common law and an unabated move away from courtroom adjudication may hamper 
the continuing evolution of the law by the courts. In the authors’ view this would 
be counterproductive. Further, in both Australia and South Africa, the parties have 
certain fundamental rights, such as the right to a fair trial, which includes the right 
of a party to present his or her case to a court for a judicial decision. In South 
Africa, this is a constitutionally protected right. A system that over-prioritises 
case management and in the process limits a party’s right to present his or her case 
appropriately or over-prioritises alternative dispute resolution and deprives a party 
from having his or her day in court, runs the risk of losing some of its quality. 
It is primarily because of these concerns that the authors would caution against 
simply emulating the Australian approach in South Africa. A balanced and nuanced 
approach would be preferable. In terms of such an approach, courts would actively 
manage cases and encourage and enable the voluntary private and/or court-
annexed mediation of disputes without disregarding their role as state institutions 
of governance and parties’ fundamental rights, including the right to have one’s day 
in court. South African reformers and legislators should refrain from pursuing case 
management at all cost as an end in itself and from going too far in promoting out of 
court dispute resolution processes above courtroom adjudication. 
This does not mean that South Africa does not stand to benefit from having regard 
to the recent evolution of the Australian civil procedural landscape. South Africa 
still has some way to go insofar as its approach to the effective management of civil 
litigation is concerned, especially when compared to Australia. All the states and 
territories in Australia have adopted comprehensive legislative measures to regulate 
298 MB v NB (n 290).
299 According to Molot (n 281) 42, if judges did not adopt an active judicial management role, it would 
“clog dockets, increase litigation costs, and free litigants to use litigation’s expense and delay to 
gain unfair tactical advantages over their adversaries. For every potential problem that managerial 
judging‘s critics identify, its defenders identify other cases in which judicial case management has 
facilitated efficient resolutions and saved valuable court resources”. 
300 par 3.2 above.
301 See par 3.2 and 4.2 above.
302 McIntyre (n 11).
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case management. These measures encourage and mandate an active role by courts 
in managing civil litigation. However, South African superior courts continue to 
rely on their inherent jurisdiction, as echoed in section 173 of the constitution and 
supplemented by the practice directives of the respective divisions of the high court, 
to manage civil litigation. As South African courts are still far from institutionalising 
effective case management techniques, the South African civil procedural system 
remains exposed to the inherent limitations of unregulated ad hoc managerial 
judging in civil proceedings. It may therefore be worthwhile for South African 
reformers and legislators, through the adoption of legislation, expressly to empower 
judges to assume an active role in civil cases, thus enabling them to manage these 
proceedings proficiently. Similarly, it may be worthwhile to consider following the 
Australian example of institutionalising mediation as an effective civil litigation 
management and resolution tool in the South African superior courts. However, in 
the authors’ view it should not be done on a mandatory basis. As mentioned, there 
are many reasons why voluntary court-annexed mediation may be beneficial from 
the perspective of managing and resolving civil disputes in South Africa.
303
SAMEVATTING
GEREGTELIKE SAAKBESTUUR IN AUSTRALIË AS MOONTLIK 
NAVOLGINGSWAARDIGE VOORBEELD VIR SUID-AFRIKA
Die artikel oorweeg, as uitgangspunt, die Australiese geregtelike saakbestuur-sisteem. Oorweging 
word spesifiek gegee aan die posisie in Engeland ten einde die agtergrond vir die hervorming van 
die Australiese sisteem te kontekstualiseer. Die artikel fokus op Victoria en Wes-Australië as tipiese 
voorbeelde van Australiese state wat twee verskillende benaderinge tot geregtelike saakbestuur binne 
die konteks van die Australiese federale sisteem volg. Die artikel oorweeg verder die interaksie tussen 
geregtelike saakbestuur en die howe se benadering tot alternatiewe geskilbeslegting. In hierdie verband 
word die rol wat howe op die gebied van alternatiewe geskilbeslegting behoort te vervul, bespreek. 
Daarna, in die konteks van beide geregtelike saakbestuur en alternatiewe geskilbeslegting, word 
oorweging gegee aan die impak hiervan op die fundamentele regte of waarborge van partye tot siviele 
verrigtinge. 
Die outeurs bespreek die hof se staatsregtelike rol binne die konteks van geskilbeslegting en 
argumenteer dat die hof dit nie sonder meer behoort te versaak ten behoewe van alternatiewe 
geskilbeslegting, soos mediasie nie. Dit is volgens die outeurs kontra-produktief. Die outeurs maak 
melding van die partye se fundamentele regte, soos die reg op ŉ billike verhoor, wat insluit die reg van 
ŉ party om sy of haar saak aan ŉ hof te stel vir ŉ regterlike beslissing. ŉ Stelsel wat ŉ uitermate verhewe 
prioriteit aan geregtelike saakbestuur verleen en in die proses ŉ party se reg inperk om sy of haar saak 
na behore aan te bied of alternatiewe geskilbeslegting te hoog aanslaan en ŉ party van sy of haar dag in 
die hof ontneem, loop volgens die outeurs die gevaar om kwaliteit in te boet. 
Uiteindelik word die posisie in Suid-Afrika betreffende geregtelike saakbestuur en alternatiewe 
geskilbeslegting bespreek ten einde te bepaal of daar enige lesse vanuit die Australiese model geneem 
kan word ter bevoordeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie. Daar word bevind dat Suid-Afrika nie 
blindelings die posisie in Australië moet nastreef nie en dat ŉ gebalanseerde en genuanseerde 
benadering verkieslik is. Dit beteken egter nie dat Suid-Afrika nie by oorweging van die Australiese 
model kan baat nie. 
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